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11	Attorneys for Defendant FCA US, LLC		
12			
13	STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
14	NEW MOTOR VEHICLE BOARD		
15			
16 17	MATHEW ENTERPRISE, INC., dba STEVENS CREEK CHRYSLER JEEP AND DODGE,	Protest Nos.: PR-2484-16, PR-2485-16, PR-2486-16, and PR-2487-16	
18	Plaintiff,	MOTION TO DISMISS PROTESTS	
19	vs.	WOTON TO DISMISS INCIDENTS	
20	FCA US, LLC,		
21	Defendant.		
22			
23	Respondent FCA US, LLC ("FCA") hereby submits this Motion to Dismiss Protest		
24	Nos. PR-2484-16, PR-2485-16, PR-2486-16, and PR-2487-16 (the "Protests").		
25	INTRODUCTION		
26	Mathew Enterprise, Inc., d/b/a Stevens Creek Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram ("Protestant") filed		
27	its Protests with the California New Motor Vehicle Board (the "Board") alleging "constructive"		
28	termination of its dealership. Yet far from being	ng terminated, constructively or otherwise, Protestant	

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remains in business. Indeed, a customer could buy a vehicle there today. To that end, FCA is not presently seeking to terminate Protestant's dealer agreements. For these reasons, and those set forth below, FCA respectfully requests that the Board dismiss Protestant's Protests with prejudice.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

FCA is the manufacturer of Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge and Ram ("CJDR") motor vehicles of which Protestant is a dealer. As a CJDR dealer, Protestant has entered into certain dealer agreements with FCA, also called Sales & Service Agreements ("SSAs"). The SSAs contain explicit provisions relative to the termination of a dealer, none of which have been implicated here with respect to Protestant.

Protestant claims that FCA's rejection of Protestant's relocation proposal is tantamount to a termination by FCA. Yet, Protestant continues to operate as a FCA dealer today, and FCA has not sent any notice to Protestant pursuant to the termination provisions of the SSAs or pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 3060.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

The Board is a quasi-judicial administrative agency of limited jurisdiction. *BWM of N. Am.*, *Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd.*, 162 Cal.App.3d 980, 994, 209 Cal.Rptr. 50 (Ct. App. 1984). It does not have plenary authority to resolve any and all disputes which may arise between a motor vehicle manufacturer and dealer. The Board's jurisdiction under Veh. Code § 3060 encompasses disputes arising over the termination, replacement or modification of a dealer agreement. Claims arising from disputes with other legal bases must be directed to a different forum. *Ri-Joyce, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd.*, 2 Cal. App. 4th 445, 455, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 551–52 (1992).

With respect to termination actions, Cal. Veh. Code § 3060 is very specific:

- (a) Notwithstanding Section 20999.1 of the Business and Professions Code or the terms of any franchise, no franchisor shall terminate or refuse to continue any existing franchise unless all of the following conditions are met:
 - (1) The franchisee and the board have received written notice from the franchisor...
 - (2) Except as provided in Section 3050.7, the board finds that there is good cause

for termination or refusal to continue, following a hearing called pursuant to Section 3066...

(3) The franchisor has received the written consent of the franchisee, or the appropriate period for filing a protest has elapsed.

Cal. Veh. Code § 3060.

Although a dealer can voluntarily terminate its operations, the termination of a dealer pursuant to Section 3060 refers to action taken by a manufacturer under the termination provisions of the operative dealer agreement.

In this case, there simply is not a termination proceeding at issue. FCA is not seeking to terminate Protestant's SSAs. Indeed, FCA has not taken a single step to terminate Protestant.

As Section 3060(a)(1) requires, there must be a "notice" received by the Board from the manufacturer as a condition precedent to any termination protest. Protestant correctly concedes that FCA has not provided notice of intent to terminate Protestant's SSAs. *See* November 22, 2016 Protest re: Chrysler at p. 9. And the reason for this is clear – FCA has not and is not currently pursuing any termination measures against Protestant. As no such notice has been issued by FCA or received by the Board, the Board lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the Protests and the Protests should be dismissed with prejudice.

Moreover, Protestant's argument that FCA's rejection of Protestant's relocation proposal constitutes "constructive termination" of Protestant's SSAs does not bring this purported dispute within the purview of the Board's jurisdiction.

First, the Board has found that the proper forum for alleged constructive or de facto termination is civil litigation before a court of competent jurisdiction. *See Roadtrek Motorhomes v. California New Motor Vehicle Bd.*, No. G049534, 2016 WL 3885006, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. July 14, 2016) ("As the ALJ recognized, the forum for [the protestant's] claim that [the manufacturer's] actions in late 2009 triggered a de facto termination of the franchises, is a civil action.").

In addition, constructive termination has not occurred in this case because the Protestant's dealership is still in business and operating as an FCA dealership. As Protestant points out, FCA

rejected Protestant's relocation proposal in early 2016. See November 22, 2016 Protest re: Chrysler at pp. 6-7. Now, nearly one year later, Protestant's dealership has not been "terminated" and is still up and running.

Given that Protestant's allegations do not concern a termination of Protestant's dealer agreement or any other issue within the Board's jurisdiction, the Board lacks authority to consider the purported dispute described in the Protests. *See Hardin Oldsmobile v. New Motor Vehicle Bd.*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 585, 593–94, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 583, 588 (1997) ("It cannot be said that the Board has jurisdiction over statutory and common law claims not specified in the enabling legislation merely because some of the facts forming the foundation for such a claim could have been asserted as the foundation of statutory protest claims within the Board's jurisdiction."); *see also Id.* at 591 ("it is evident that the Legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of the Board to consideration and resolution of only a circumscribed domain of matters.").

As such, in this case, the Board should exercise its authority to dismiss Protestant's Protests. *See Duarte & Witting, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd.* (App. 3 Dist. 2002) 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 501, 104 Cal.App.4th 626. ("New Motor Vehicle Board had implied statutory authority to dismiss car dealer's protest of car manufacturer's decision to terminate one of dealer's franchises.").

WHEREFORE, FCA respectfully requests that the Board dismiss Protestant's Protests with prejudice.

Dated: January 9, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

Robert E. Davies, Esq. (California Bar No. 106810) Mary A. Stewart, Esq. (California Bar No. 106758) **Donahue Davies LLP**

~and~

Mark T. Clouatre, Esq. (Colorado Bar No. 29892) Adrienne L. Toon (Colorado Bar No. 42984) Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough

Counsel for FCA US, LLC

PROOF OF SERVICE

1	PROOF OF SERVICE		
2	CAPTION:	MATHEW ENTERPRISE, INC., d/b/a STEVENS CREEK CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE AND RAM v. FCA US, LLC	
3	BOARD:	NEW MOTOR VEHICLE BOARD	
5	PROTEST NOS.:	PR-2484-16, PR-2485-16, PR-2486-16, and PR-2487-16	
6	I am employed in the County of Sacramento, State of California. I am over the age of 1 years and not a party to this action. My business address is P.O. Box 277010, Sacramento, California 95827-7010.		
7			
8	On January 9, 2017, I served the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS PROTESTS on each party in this action, as follows:		
9		v Offices of Michel J. Flanagan chael J. Flanagan	
10	Tor	in M. Heenan 7 Fair Oaks Boulevard, Suite 450	
11	Sac	ramento, CA 95825 6) 646-9100	
12	(91)	6) 646-9138 ail: lawmjf@msh.com	
13		orneys for Protestant	
14			
15 16	Sacramento, the firm's pro- with the Uni	I caused such envelope to be deposited in the United States Mail at California, with postage thereon fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with ractice of collection and processing documents for mailing. It is deposited ited states postal service each day and that practice was followed in the arse of business for the serve herein attested to.	
17			
18	Court, Rule	MILE) The facsimile machine I used complied with California Rules of 2003, and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to California urt, Rule 2006(d), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the	
19		a, a copy of which is attached to this Affidavit.	
20	☐ (BY FEDER the next day	RAL EXPRESS) I caused such envelope to be delivered by air courier, with	
21		L) at the e-mail address listed above.	
22		January 9, 2017, at Sacramento, California.	
23	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.		
24	i deciate und	der penaity of perjuly that the foregoing is title and correct.	
25		HAIN .	
26		Erin Sanchez	
27			
28	,		